The Effect of Female Leadership on Contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street

67 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2020 Last revised: 9 Apr 2021

See all articles by Nataliya Gerasimova

Nataliya Gerasimova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance

Maximilian Rohrer

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 11, 2020

Abstract

This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians affect the distribution of government spending to women-owned firms. Exploiting close elections to address endogeneity, we show that female House Representatives increase the allocation of U.S. government procurement contracts to women-owned firms in their respective districts. Consistent with inaccurate statistical discrimination, the effect persists after her departure, is strongest in districts with no prior female representation, and is not associated with declines in contract performance. Analysing congressional requests from legislators to federal agencies, we argue that female politicians use individual oversight to influence contract allocation.

Keywords: Female politicians, women-owned firms, female entrepreneurs, small businesses, government contracting, government procurement, gender bias, public expenditure allocation

JEL Classification: D72, G38, H57, J16, J71, L26, P16

Suggested Citation

Gerasimova, Nataliya and Rohrer, Maximilian, The Effect of Female Leadership on Contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street (June 11, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3624880

Nataliya Gerasimova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Maximilian Rohrer (Contact Author)

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

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