The Effect of Female Leadership on Contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street

70 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2020 Last revised: 6 Apr 2022

See all articles by Jonathan Brogaard

Jonathan Brogaard

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Nataliya Gerasimova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance

Maximilian Rohrer

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics

Date Written: April 5, 2022

Abstract

This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. The identification strategy uses close elections for the US House of Representatives. The effect concentrates in local contractors and persists after the female politician's departure. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting does not seem to be associated with economic costs, as the firm characteristics of the average contractor and contract performances are unchanged. By analyzing congressional requests from legislators to federal agencies, we show that female politicians affect procurement contract allocation through individual oversight.

Keywords: Small Business, Women-Owned Firms, Government Procurement Contracts, Female Politicians, Gender Gap

JEL Classification: D72, J16, J71, G38, H57, L26, P16

Suggested Citation

Brogaard, Jonathan and Gerasimova, Nataliya and Rohrer, Maximilian, The Effect of Female Leadership on Contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street (April 5, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3624880

Jonathan Brogaard

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanbrogaard.com

Nataliya Gerasimova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Maximilian Rohrer (Contact Author)

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

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