Voluntary Disclosure in a Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly

21 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2020

See all articles by Michael Kopel

Michael Kopel

University of Graz

Eva Putz

University of Graz

Date Written: June 10, 2020


The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where one firm sets quantities while the other firm sets prices. Such a hybrid structure frequently captures firm behavior in real-world markets. Accordingly, this paper contributes to our understanding of how firms' choices of strategic market variables influences firms' voluntary disclosure incentives. In a setting where firm owners provide strategic incentives to their managers and can either disclose the details of the managerial compensation contract or keep them secret, we find that the Cournot firm punishes its manager for sales and the Bertrand firm induces more aggressive market choices by rewarding sales. Firms' disclosure choices in equilibrium depend on the level of product substitution. A full disclosure equilibrium where both firms reveal the details of their managerial contract information occurs if the firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. In this case, voluntary disclosure leads to lower consumer welfare, but higher total welfare than if contract information is kept secret by both firms. If product differentiation is low, then we find two partial disclosure equilibria where either the Cournot firm or the Bertrand firm keeps contract information private. In this case, we argue that mandating disclosure can lead to an increase consumer and social welfare, but might decrease firm profits.

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, managerial contract information, strategic incentives, Cournot-Bertrand

JEL Classification: D82, L13, L22, M41

Suggested Citation

Kopel, Michael and Putz, Eva, Voluntary Disclosure in a Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly (June 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3625198 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3625198

Michael Kopel (Contact Author)

University of Graz ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15 / FE
A-8010 Graz, 8010

Eva Putz

University of Graz ( email )

Universit├Ątsstra├če 15/E4
Graz, 8010

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