Do Court Delays Distort Capital Formation?

65 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2020 Last revised: 23 Mar 2022

See all articles by Pantelis Koutroumpis

Pantelis Koutroumpis

Oxford Martin Programme of Technological and Economic Change; University of Oxford - Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School; Imperial College Business School

Farshad Ravasan

University of Oxford - Oxford Martin School

Date Written: July 17, 2020

Abstract

We study how longer bankruptcy trials affect the size, structure, and allocation of corporate capital. Exploiting a legal reform that reorganised the judicial districts in Italy, we provide three novel insights into the real and allocational effects of legal institutions. First, poor enforcement of financial contracts leads firms to under-allocate capital in intangible assets. Second, it aggravates misallocation by preventing the optimal allocation of physical and intangible assets towards firms with high capital return. Third, in addition to court delays, our findings shed light on the importance of distance from the court as another source of organizational frictions in bankruptcy.

Keywords: court enforcement, bankruptcy proceedings, corporate intangible capital, misallocation, corporate debt overhang, distance from the court

JEL Classification: E22, G33, K40, O16

Suggested Citation

Koutroumpis, Pantelis and Ravasan, Farshad, Do Court Delays Distort Capital Formation? (July 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3626468 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3626468

Pantelis Koutroumpis

Oxford Martin Programme of Technological and Economic Change ( email )

University of Oxford
34 Broad Street
Oxford, OX1 3BD
United Kingdom
01865610388 (Phone)
OX1 3BD (Fax)

University of Oxford - Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School ( email )

Eagle House
Walton Well Road
Oxford, OX2 6ED
United Kingdom

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Farshad Ravasan (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Oxford Martin School ( email )

University of Oxford
34 Broad Street
Oxford, OX1 3BD
United Kingdom

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