Trade's Experimental Compliance Mechanisms

International Economic Dispute Settlement: Demise or Transformation? (eds. Manfred Elsig, Rodrigo Polanco, Peter van den Bossche) (Cambridge University Press) (2020, Forthcoming)

21 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2020 Last revised: 21 Jul 2020

Date Written: March 15, 2020

Abstract

This Chapter draws attention to novel compliance mechanisms for labor and environment commitments in trade agreements. While the call for “more” and “better enforcement” has dominated public rhetoric, the institutional forms have varied. In the context of their recent efforts to modernize or update their trade agreements, the United States and other governments have adopted innovative designs in these areas. These new experimental institutions reflect a move away from state-to-state dispute settlement as the primary means of “enforcing” labor and environment commitments. They demonstrate that alternative arrangements are not just possible but may be desirable for these types of obligations. This Chapter aims to afford a better understanding of the range of new mechanisms and still others.

Keywords: trade, labor, environment, agreements, enforcement, compliance, international law, institutional design

Suggested Citation

Claussen, Kathleen, Trade's Experimental Compliance Mechanisms (March 15, 2020). International Economic Dispute Settlement: Demise or Transformation? (eds. Manfred Elsig, Rodrigo Polanco, Peter van den Bossche) (Cambridge University Press) (2020, Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627364

Kathleen Claussen (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

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