Trade's Experimental Compliance Mechanisms
International Economic Dispute Settlement: Demise or Transformation? (eds. Manfred Elsig, Rodrigo Polanco, Peter van den Bossche) (Cambridge University Press) (2020, Forthcoming)
21 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2020 Last revised: 21 Jul 2020
Date Written: March 15, 2020
Abstract
This Chapter draws attention to novel compliance mechanisms for labor and environment commitments in trade agreements. While the call for “more” and “better enforcement” has dominated public rhetoric, the institutional forms have varied. In the context of their recent efforts to modernize or update their trade agreements, the United States and other governments have adopted innovative designs in these areas. These new experimental institutions reflect a move away from state-to-state dispute settlement as the primary means of “enforcing” labor and environment commitments. They demonstrate that alternative arrangements are not just possible but may be desirable for these types of obligations. This Chapter aims to afford a better understanding of the range of new mechanisms and still others.
Keywords: trade, labor, environment, agreements, enforcement, compliance, international law, institutional design
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