Observability and Reasoned Discourse: Evidence from the U.S. Senate

53 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2020 Last revised: 12 Oct 2020

See all articles by Edward Stiglitz

Edward Stiglitz

Cornell University - Law School

Aviv Caspi

Cornell University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 15, 2020

Abstract

Many private and public institutions depend on reasoned discourse to reach decisions. Before collective action, before voting, tends to come reasoned discourse, at least in aspiration. Reformers commonly call for increases in the transparency of collective decision-making, lobbying for instance for the Supreme Court to televise proceedings. Here, we examine reasoned discourse in one important public body, the U.S. Senate, and study how increasing transparency through the introduction of C-SPAN changed legislative discourse. We find that the introduction of C-SPAN encouraged member discourse to herd with co-partisans and to anti-herd with cross-partisans; it also appears to have led to the restructuring of Senate time to facilitate performative speech. Suggesting the information problems and career incentives at play, these herding and anti-herding effects seem strongest for those closest to an election and for those with less sophisticated constituencies.

Suggested Citation

Stiglitz, Edward and Caspi, Aviv, Observability and Reasoned Discourse: Evidence from the U.S. Senate (June 15, 2020). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20-42, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3627564

Edward Stiglitz (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

Aviv Caspi

Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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