Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness

68 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2020 Last revised: 29 Jun 2020

See all articles by Matteo Gamalerio

Matteo Gamalerio

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Margherita Negri

University of St. Andrews

Date Written: June 2020

Abstract

Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers from

the central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model.

Keywords: Electoral Rules, Immigration, Occupational choice, SPRAR

JEL Classification: D72, J24, J61, R23

Suggested Citation

Gamalerio, Matteo and Morelli, Massimo and Negri, Margherita, Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness (June 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14896, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628219

Matteo Gamalerio (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) ( email )

c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Margherita Negri

University of St. Andrews ( email )

The Gateway
North Haugh
St Andrews, Fife KY16 9RJ
United Kingdom

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