How Policing Incentives Affect Crime, Measurement, and Justice
51 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2024
Date Written: August 10, 2020
Abstract
In this paper we develop a model where the police choose between investigating and patrolling, while civilians choose between producing and stealing. We derive a truth table for the equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, that can holistically evaluate the effects of police performance incentives. To test the model, we conduct an experiment that varies how severely an officer is reprimanded for false punishments. We find that stronger reprimands do not change crime, increase civilian incomes, and decrease false positives. We also find that the clearance rate, a measure of performance used widely in econometric studies, suggests police performance is better when it is unambiguously worse.
Keywords: police incentives, crime, truth table of criminal justice
JEL Classification: C7, J1, K4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation