How Policing Incentives Affect Crime, Measurement, and Justice

51 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2024

See all articles by Jordan Adamson

Jordan Adamson

Leipzig University, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: August 10, 2020

Abstract

In this paper we develop a model where the police choose between investigating and patrolling, while civilians choose between producing and stealing. We derive a truth table for the equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, that can holistically evaluate the effects of police performance incentives. To test the model, we conduct an experiment that varies how severely an officer is reprimanded for false punishments. We find that stronger reprimands do not change crime, increase civilian incomes, and decrease false positives. We also find that the clearance rate, a measure of performance used widely in econometric studies, suggests police performance is better when it is unambiguously worse.

Keywords: police incentives, crime, truth table of criminal justice

JEL Classification: C7, J1, K4

Suggested Citation

Adamson, Jordan and Rentschler, Lucas, How Policing Incentives Affect Crime, Measurement, and Justice (August 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628595

Jordan Adamson (Contact Author)

Leipzig University, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics ( email )

Grimmaische Str. 12
Leipzig, 04109
Germany

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

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