CSI in the Tropics Experimental Evidence of Improved Public Service Delivery Through Coordination

66 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2020 Last revised: 26 Jun 2020

See all articles by Daniela Collazos

Daniela Collazos

Secretariat of Security of Bogota

Leopoldo Fergusson

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Miguel La Rota

Crime and Justice Lab, Colombia

Daniel Mejia

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Daniel Ortega

CAF Development Bank of Latin America

Date Written: June 16, 2020

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impacts of increased coordination, accountability, and leadership among teams of responsible public officials, with evidence from homicide investigations in Colombia. We randomly assigned the investigations of 66% of the 1,683 homicides occurring in Bogotá, Colombia, during 2016 to a new investigation procedure emphasizing these features. We find a statistically significant 30% increase in the conviction rate in the treatment group relative to the control group. Indicators of the quality of the investigative process also improve, as well as the rate at which a formal accusation is presented before a court. Complementary findings suggest that the treatment produces well-coordinated teams that can communicate more fluently. Also, a survey of investigative team members reveal that work motivation, the extent to which they receive feedback on their performance, the pertinence and effectiveness of their roles, and the perceived quality and coordination of the team all improve under the new scheme.

Keywords: Crime, Homicides, Team work, Public sector

JEL Classification: C93, D73, J45, K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Collazos, Daniela and Fergusson, Leopoldo and La Rota, Miguel and Mejia, Daniel and Ortega, Daniel, CSI in the Tropics Experimental Evidence of Improved Public Service Delivery Through Coordination (June 16, 2020). Documento CEDE No. 20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3629933 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3629933

Daniela Collazos (Contact Author)

Secretariat of Security of Bogota ( email )

Av Calle 26 No 57 83
Bogota
Colombia

Leopoldo Fergusson

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/uniandes?q=Leopoldo+Fergusson

Miguel La Rota

Crime and Justice Lab, Colombia ( email )

Daniel Mejia

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1 No. 18 A - 10
Bogotá, AA4976
Colombia
57(1)3394949 ext 3737 (Phone)
57(1)3324492 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/share/scripts/home/home.php

Daniel Ortega

CAF Development Bank of Latin America ( email )

Ave. Luis Roche
P.O. Box Carmelitas 5086 Torre CAF, Altamira
Caracas
United States

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