Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism

12 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2020

See all articles by Cathy Hwang

Cathy Hwang

University of Virginia School of Law

Yaron Nili

Duke University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: January 15, 2020

Abstract

For last two decades, scholars, judges, and corporations have embraced the idea that corporations should maximize benefit for shareholders. But on a lazy summer day in August of 2019, that changed. The CEOs of nearly 200 major U.S. companies released a statement embracing stakeholder theory — the idea that corporations should look after the needs of not only shareholders, but also those of employees, suppliers, community members, and others. Many applauded this as a progressive step: a way for corporations to take control back from the outsized, greedy influence of profit-driven shareholders. This Essay takes a different view, arguing that shareholders have long been advocates of the kind of progressive values that the public desires. Instead of being a step forward, stakeholder theory is another way to entrench management.

This Essay draws on hand-collected data from companies in the S&P 1500 that shows that shareholders, not management, have been the driving force behind the environmental, social, and governance principles that often align with stakeholder governance. In particular, institutional investors and proxy advisory firms have taken the lead on pushing these policies through to management. This Essay contributes to both a long-standing literature on managerial and shareholder power, and to the timeliest debate in corporate law today. On the practical side, its novel argument — one that has yet to be explored by commentators in media or scholarly circles — gives public companies a roadmap to engage in policies that better promote diversity, sustainability, and community stewardship.

Keywords: corporate governance, corporate law, ESG

Suggested Citation

Hwang, Cathy and Nili, Yaron, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism (January 15, 2020). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. Online, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3630480

Cathy Hwang (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Yaron Nili

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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