The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees
Charles A. Dice Working Paper No. 2020-14
63 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2020 Last revised: 2 Jul 2020
Date Written: June 24, 2020
We study the long-run outcomes associated with hedge funds' compensation structure. Over a 22-year period, the aggregate effective incentive fee rate is 2.5 times the average contractual rate (i.e., around 50% instead of 20%). Overall, investors collected 36 cents for every dollar earned on their invested capital (over a risk-free hurdle rate and before adjusting for any risk). In the cross-section of funds, there is a substantial disconnect between lifetime performance and incentive fees earned. These poor outcomes stem from the asymmetry of the performance contract, investors' return-chasing behavior, and underwater fund closures.
Keywords: Hedge Funds, Performance, Asset Management, Incentive Fees
JEL Classification: G11, G23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation