Faculty Research Incentives and Business School Health: A New Perspective for Marketing

50 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2020

See all articles by S. Stremersch

S. Stremersch

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Russell S. Winer

New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing

Nuno Almeida Camacho

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Date Written: June 19, 2020

Abstract

Prior research has heavily debated the value of academic research of faculty to the business schools that employ them. We study, conceptually and empirically (by surveying faculty and interviewing (associate) deans), the role of the faculty research incentive system in business school health. We find that higher research health is congruent with higher teaching quality, stronger resource support, and stronger external stakeholder support. R-quality of research (i.e., rigor) contributes more strongly to research health than research quantity, while q-quality of research (i.e., relevance) contributes positively to teaching quality and external stakeholder support. We also find that research task incentives are misaligned: (1) in faculty evaluations, the number of publications receives too much weight, while creativity, literacy, practical relevance, and awards receive too little weight; and (2) the faculty feels that they are insufficiently compensated, while (associate) deans feel faculty is compensated too much for its research. These incentive misalignments are largest in schools that perform the worst on research and business school health overall. We explore improvements that business schools and faculty can introduce.

Keywords: business school, marketing, academic research, research faculty, incentives, scientometrics

Suggested Citation

Stremersch, Stefan and Winer, Russell S. and Almeida Camacho, Nuno, Faculty Research Incentives and Business School Health: A New Perspective for Marketing (June 19, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3631046 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3631046

Stefan Stremersch

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 408 8719 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9160 (Fax)

Russell S. Winer

New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing ( email )

Henry Kaufman Ctr
44 W 4 St.
New York, NY
United States
212-998-0540 (Phone)
212-995-4006 (Fax)

Nuno Almeida Camacho (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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