Financial Product Design in Decentralized Markets

43 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2020 Last revised: 19 Jun 2023

See all articles by Marzena J. Rostek

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Ji Hee Yoon

University College London

Date Written: June 19, 2023


Decentralized trading motivates financial innovation that would be neutral if assets cleared jointly: Synthetic products, such as derivatives, are generally nonredundant. In markets with large traders, synthetic products alter the price impact for the underlying assets and, when appropriately designed, enhance risk sharing and diversification. While mutual funds are efficient in decentralized markets with competitive investors, they generally are not when traders are large. Instead, a limited number of synthetic products tailored to traders’ desired risk profile strictly increase welfare under general conditions. The efficient set of securities differs from the underlying assets. It facilitates trading of all fundamental risks but generally forgoes hedging all contingencies in response to price impact.

Keywords: Imperfect competition, Decentralized market, Security design, Market design, Liquidity, Price impact, Efficiency

JEL Classification: D47, D53, D82, G11, G12

Suggested Citation

Rostek, Marzena J. and Yoon, Ji Hee, Financial Product Design in Decentralized Markets (June 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: or

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53703
United States
(608) 262-6723 (Phone)
(608) 262-2033 (Fax)


Ji Hee Yoon (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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