Corruption, Democracy and Privately Financed Infrastructure

Forthcoming in Administration & Society

40 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2020 Last revised: 16 Jul 2020

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics; Pennsylvania State University

Valentina Mele

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management

Eleanor F. Woodhouse

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Date Written: June 22, 2020

Abstract

Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition increases the cost of corruption for private partners and focuses politicians’ attention on providing projects with public (rather than private) benefits. Without such incentives, corruption is not contained and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984-2012, we find that as public sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens.

Keywords: Corruption; Infrastructure; Political Institutions

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Mele, Valentina and Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence, Corruption, Democracy and Privately Financed Infrastructure (June 22, 2020). Forthcoming in Administration & Society, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632958

Anthony M. Bertelli

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Valentina Mele

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Eleanor Florence Woodhouse (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

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