The Private Value Single Item Bisection Auction
METEOR Working Paper No. rm/02/035
23 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2003
Date Written: November 15, 2002
Abstract
In this paper we present a new iterative acution, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the English auction shares with the Vickrey auction: There exists an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which everyone truthfully reveals his information, the object is allocated in accordance with efficiency requirements to the buyer who has the highest valuation, and the price paid by the winner of the object equals the second-highest valuation.
Keywords: Single item auction, Nash equilibria, weakly dominant strategy, extensive form games of incomplete information
JEL Classification: C72, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation