Policy Options for Taxing the Rich

Maintaining the Strength of American Capitalism (eds. Melissa Kearney and Amy Ganz, The Aspen Institute, 2019)

35 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2020

See all articles by Lily L. Batchelder

Lily L. Batchelder

New York University School of Law

David Kamin

New York University School of Law

Date Written: November 21, 2019

Abstract

The U.S. economy exhibits high inequality and low economic mobility across generations relative to other high-income countries. The United States will need to raise more revenues in order to reduce these disparities, finance much-needed new services and investments, and address the nation’s long-term fiscal needs. This paper outlines policy options for raising a large amount of revenues primarily from the most affluent, first discussing potential incremental reforms and then focusing on four main options for more structural reform: dramatically increasing the top tax rates on labor and other ordinary income; effectively taxing the wealthy on accrued gains as they arise and at ordinary rates; a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals; and a financial transactions tax. Although we summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, we generally conclude that they all merit serious consideration. Several options are also complementary to one another. In practice, however, the relative strengths of each of these policies will depend to a large extent on how each is designed after it has made its way through the legislative and regulatory process.

Keywords: individual taxation, wealth tax, accrual tax, mark-to-market, financial transactions tax

JEL Classification: D31, H20, H22, H24, H25, H26, H27, K34

Suggested Citation

Batchelder, Lily L. and Kamin, David, Policy Options for Taxing the Rich (November 21, 2019). Maintaining the Strength of American Capitalism (eds. Melissa Kearney and Amy Ganz, The Aspen Institute, 2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3634117

Lily L. Batchelder (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8156 (Phone)

David Kamin

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

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