Do Firms Respond to Auditors’ Red Flags? Evidence from Goodwill Impairment Key Audit Matter Disclosures 

54 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last revised: 12 Jan 2025

See all articles by Ionela Andreicovici

Ionela Andreicovici

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Anne Jeny

IESEG School of Management

Daphne Lui

ESSEC Business School

Date Written: June 24, 2020

Abstract

We investigate the link between the expanded audit report and firms’ financial disclosure decisions, focusing on auditors’ mentions of goodwill impairment as a key audit matter (KAM). Drawing from a sample of the United Kingdom Premium Listed companies with goodwill on their balance sheets during 2014-2019, we identify instances where goodwill impairment is flagged as a KAM and contrast firms’ disclosure levels on goodwill impairment using textual measures constructed from information in their annual reports. We find that firm disclosure on goodwill impairment increases (decreases) when auditors start (stop) mentioning goodwill impairment as a KAM. The increase in disclosure is more pronounced in the presence of stronger external information demand and better internal governance. Finally, firms are more likely to impair goodwill in the period following auditors’ mention of goodwill impairment as a KAM. Overall, this paper establishes the role of the expanded audit report for firm disclosure.

Keywords: disclosure, expanded audit report, goodwill impairment, KAM

JEL Classification: M41, M42, M48

Suggested Citation

Andreicovici, Ionela and Jeny, Anne and Lui, Daphne,
Do Firms Respond to Auditors’ Red Flags? Evidence from Goodwill Impairment Key Audit Matter Disclosures 

(June 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3634479 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3634479

Ionela Andreicovici (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee, 32-34
32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

Anne Jeny

IESEG School of Management ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Defense
Puteaux, Paris 92800
France

Daphne Lui

ESSEC Business School ( email )

Av Bernard Hirsch
Cergy-Pontoise 95021
France

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