Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect

69 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2020 Last revised: 3 Feb 2021

See all articles by Stefano Barbieri

Stefano Barbieri

Tulane University - Department of Economics

Marco Serena

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: June 25, 2020

Abstract

In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. If a player is stronger in every battle (e.g., a candidate is favorite by the entire electorate), then expenditures are smaller in sequential than in simultaneous contests, as in the literature for homogeneous players, and the stronger player is more likely to win in sequential than simultaneous contests. However, if players' advantages alternate across battles, then expenditures may be greater in sequential than in simultaneous contests, and the player who has the advantage later in sequential contest is more likely to win: dynamics affect representation. We interpret our results in light of the candidates' advantages due to states' demographics in the 2020 US primaries and discuss novel testable implications of our analysis.

Keywords: C72, D72, D74, D82

JEL Classification: contests, momentum effect, temporal structures

Suggested Citation

Barbieri, Stefano and Serena, Marco, Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect (June 25, 2020). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635360

Stefano Barbieri

Tulane University - Department of Economics ( email )

New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Marco Serena (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
Abstract Views
424
rank
406,021
PlumX Metrics