Voting in Synchronized Elections: Evidence from India

117 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2020 Last revised: 13 Jan 2025

See all articles by Vimal Balasubramaniam

Vimal Balasubramaniam

Queen Mary University of London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Apurav Yash Bhatiya

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Sabyasachi Das

Ahmedabad University

Date Written: January 09, 2025

Abstract

Voters often participate in multiple elections across governance tiers, often on the same day. We investigate how synchronizing two salient elections influences voter behavior and electoral outcomes, leveraging variation in the timing of national and state elections in India. We find that synchronized elections, compared to closely timed but asynchronous elections, increase political parties' salience among voters, boosting straight-ticket voting with a small increase in turnout. These effects result in a 21% higher probability of the same political party winning across tiers, without altering candidate composition. While synchronization significantly influences state government formation, it does not affect development outcomes. We provide suggestive evidence that voters' cognitive constraints and increased party campaigning as likely mechanisms. A synchronized election design in decentralized democracies like India can therefore affect the relative importance of parties vis-a-vis candidates during elections and potentially shape the nature of political decentralization.

Keywords: Synchronized elections, Party Salience, India, Election Design

JEL Classification: D02, D72, D91, H77.

Suggested Citation

Balasubramaniam, Vimal and Bhatiya, Apurav Yash and Das, Sabyasachi,

Voting in Synchronized Elections: Evidence from India

(January 09, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3636183

Vimal Balasubramaniam (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Apurav Yash Bhatiya

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Birmingham Business School
University of Birmingham
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Sabyasachi Das

Ahmedabad University ( email )

Ahmedabad
Gujarat
India

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