CEO Stress, Aging, and Death

74 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2020 Last revised: 15 Mar 2021

See all articles by Mark Borgschulte

Mark Borgschulte

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Marius Guenzel

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Canyao Liu

Yale University

Ulrike Malmendier

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2020

Abstract

We estimate the long-term effects of experiencing high levels of job demands on the mortality and aging of CEOs. The estimation exploits variation in takeover protection and industry crises. First, using hand-collected data on the dates of birth and death for 1,605 CEOs of large, publicly-listed U.S. firms, we estimate the resulting changes in mortality. The hazard estimates indicate that CEOs' lifespan increases by two years when insulated from market discipline via anti-takeover laws, and decreases by 1.5 years in response to an industry-wide downturn. Second, we apply neural-network based machine-learning techniques to assess visible signs of aging in pictures of CEOs. We estimate that exposure to a distress shock during the Great Recession increases CEOs' apparent age by one year over the next decade. Our findings imply significant health costs of managerial stress, also relative to known health risks.

Suggested Citation

Borgschulte, Mark and Guenzel, Marius and Liu, Canyao and Malmendier, Ulrike, CEO Stress, Aging, and Death (June 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14933, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3638037

Mark Borgschulte (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

601 E John St
Champaign, IL 61820
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Marius Guenzel

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
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Canyao Liu

Yale University ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

Ulrike Malmendier

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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