On the Importance of Fiscal Space: Evidence from Short Sellers during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Posted: 23 Jul 2020 Last revised: 2 Sep 2022

See all articles by Stefan Greppmair

Stefan Greppmair

Deutsche Bundesbank

Stephan Jank

Deutsche Bundesbank

Esad Smajlbegovic

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 22, 2021

Abstract

Using the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, we study how informed market participants incorporate fiscal space into their trading decisions. At the onset of the pandemic, short-selling activity shifted towards companies with low financial flexibility but only in countries with limited fiscal space. Among such companies, short sellers specifically targeted those that generate their revenues mainly in the domestic market. These short sellers entered their positions before the market crash, thereby generating significant abnormal returns. We find no evidence of either herding behavior prior to the market crash or a long-run performance reversal of short sellers. These findings support the notion that short sellers help to promote price efficiency in times of crisis, where governments with budgetary constraints are unable to provide sufficient stimuli to their economies.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, short selling, fiscal space, institutional investors

JEL Classification: G14, G23, H30

Suggested Citation

Greppmair, Stefan and Jank, Stephan and Smajlbegovic, Esad, On the Importance of Fiscal Space: Evidence from Short Sellers during the COVID-19 Pandemic (December 22, 2021). Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3638584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3638584

Stefan Greppmair

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Stephan Jank

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Esad Smajlbegovic (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/esmajlbe/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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