Deception aversion, communal norm violation and consumer responses to prosocial initiatives

Abstract

Companies face increasing pressure to adopt social responsibility initiatives while simultaneously providing shareholder value. However, consumers may respond negatively to “win-win” initiatives that benefit society while bringing financial gain to the corporation, thus producing a backlash effect. Previous researchers have attributed this backlash effect to the violation of a communal relationship norm that companies trigger in consumers when communicating their win-win initiatives. We propose an alternative hypothesis, that the backlash derives from people’s deception aversion. We find evidence supporting deception aversion in three preregistered studies showing that companies are evaluated negatively when their actions differ from those implied by their stated prosocial policy and not, as predicted by the communal norm violation hypothesis, merely when they earn a profit. Our results suggest that companies should not fear that earning a profit from prosocial activities will carry reputational risk, so long as they are transparent.

Keywords: deception aversion, communal norm violation, profit, prosociality, experimental studies