Online Appendix for 'Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition'

82 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2020 Last revised: 10 Jan 2023

See all articles by Hui Chen

Hui Chen

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Winston Wei Dou

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hongye Guo

University of Pennsylvania

Yan Ji

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Date Written: December 31, 2022

Abstract

This is the supplemental material to the paper titled “Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition” (Chen et al., 2022a). It includes the rigorous mathematical proofs for all the theoretical results in Chen et al. (2022a), and a comprehensive summary of the direct empirical evidence on tacit collusion in the literature. It also provides many additional quantitative and empirical results.

Keywords: Competition-distress feedback loop, Distress spillover, Predatory price war, Profitability-leverage puzzle, Tacit collusion

JEL Classification: C73, D43, E31, G3, L13, O33

Suggested Citation

Chen, Hui and Dou, Winston Wei and Guo, Hongye and Ji, Yan, Online Appendix for 'Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition' (December 31, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3641278 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3641278

Hui Chen

Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
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+1 (617) 324-3896 (Phone)

Winston Wei Dou (Contact Author)

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania ( email )

2318 Steinberg Hall - Dietrich Hall
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Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://finance-faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wdou/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/people/winston_wei_dou?page=1&perPage=50

Hongye Guo

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Yan Ji

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

Clearwater Bay
Kowloon, 999999
Hong Kong

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