17 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2003
This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000), we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.
Keywords: Regulation, Commons, Legislatures, Duopoly
JEL Classification: K0, H1
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Klick, Jonathan, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01; FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=364241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.364241