Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition

17 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2003

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna; University of Miami, School of Law

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Abstract

This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000), we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.

Keywords: Regulation, Commons, Legislatures, Duopoly

JEL Classification: K0, H1

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Klick, Jonathan, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01, FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=364241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.364241

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

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University of Bologna ( email )

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University of Miami, School of Law ( email )

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )

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Germany
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Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

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Erasmus School of Law ( email )

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PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

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