Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Change

45 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2020

See all articles by Daniel L. Bennett

Daniel L. Bennett

University of Louisville

Christian Bjørnskov

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Center for Political Studies; Institute for Corruption Studies

Stephan Gohmann

University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 27, 2019

Abstract

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific policies change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the Bjørnskov-Rode coup data, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not.

Keywords: Coups, Institutional Quality, Autocracy; Corruption; Judicial Constraints; Regime Transition

Suggested Citation

Bennett, Daniel and Bjørnskov, Christian and Gohmann, Stephan, Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Change (May 27, 2019). IFN Working Paper No. 1281, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3643404 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3643404

Daniel Bennett

University of Louisville ( email )

Louisville, KY 40292
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.louisville.edu/faculty-research/faculty-directory/daniel-bennett/

Christian Bjørnskov (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V, DK-8210
Denmark

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Center for Political Studies

Landgreven 3
Copenhagen K, DK-1301
Denmark

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Stephan Gohmann

University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Louisville, KY 40292
United States

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