Pricing Algorithms as Collusive Devices

19 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2020 Last revised: 15 Sep 2021

See all articles by Cento Veljanovski

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

Date Written: July 6, 2020


This paper undertakes a critical review of the prospect that self-learning pricing algorithms will lead to widespread collusion independently of the intervention and participation of humans. There is no concrete evidence, no example yet, and no antitrust case that self-learning pricing algorithms have colluded let alone increased the prospect of collusion across the economy.

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, algorithmic collusion, algorithmic pricing, collusion, competition policy, pricing bots, self-learning algorithms

JEL Classification: D42, D82, L2, D43, D50, D81, K21, L1, L13, L16, 030

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, Pricing Algorithms as Collusive Devices (July 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: or

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)

Case Associates ( email )

96 Kensington High Street
London, W8 4SG
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 73764418 (Phone)


Institute of Economic Affairs

2 Lord North Street, Westminster
London, SW1P 3LB
United Kingdom

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