Merger Control for Insolvency Resolution Plans: Do Acquisitions of Distressed Firms Warrant Competition Scrutiny?

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 2020-05-02 & Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India Research Initiative RP-01/2020

34 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2020 Last revised: 10 May 2021

See all articles by M. P. Ram Mohan

M. P. Ram Mohan

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad

Vishakha Raj

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad

Date Written: May 8, 2020

Abstract

In July 2019, the Competition Law Review Committee Report had recommended that Insolvency Resolution Plans (IRP) which result in combinations should be green-channelled. This would mean that IRP combinations would be automatically approved without any merger scrutiny. The theoretical basis of this recommendation is the ‘failing firm defence’ which allows parties to enter into mergers if they show that the exit of a firm from the market will be more harmful to competition than the merger. This paper assesses the advisability of green-channelling IRPs through the lens of competition law. It examines the IRPs which have been scrutinised by the CCI and examines whether they are treated differently from other mergers. We use the European Union as a point of comparison to describe how the failing firm defence is being implemented and to show that there can be anticompetitive effects to green-channelling IRPs without a full competition assessment. We conclude that while the failure of a firm is an important consideration when assessing mergers, it cannot be the sole determinant of their desirability.

Keywords: Insolvency and bankruptcy in India, green-chanelling, failing firm defence, competition, insolvency resolution plans

JEL Classification: F23, K2, K10, K21

Suggested Citation

M. P., Ram Mohan and Raj, Vishakha, Merger Control for Insolvency Resolution Plans: Do Acquisitions of Distressed Firms Warrant Competition Scrutiny? (May 8, 2020). Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 2020-05-02 & Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India Research Initiative RP-01/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3645879 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3645879

Ram Mohan M. P. (Contact Author)

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad ( email )

Vastrapur
Ahmedabad, Gujarat 380015
India

Vishakha Raj

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad ( email )

Vastraour
Ahmedabad, 380015
India

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
122
Abstract Views
724
Rank
437,494
PlumX Metrics