Attention Intermediaries: Regulatory Options and their Institutional Implications

42 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2020

See all articles by Giorgio Monti

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: July 7, 2020

Abstract

Further regulation of digital platforms is on the horizon. Three types of solution are posited: more aggressive use of competition law, a new dedicated competition law instrument for the European Commission that allows swifter and more effective intervention, and a fresh regulator for systemically significant platforms. The debate contains two gaps. First, at a substantive level the role of other rules is downplayed (e.g. data protection & consumer laws). In other words, the Commission and most commentators wishing for greater regulation look to new tools rather than considering the potential of existing rules. Second, at an institutional level little is said about the impact that the policy proposals may have on other rules and other regulatory authorities. This paper addresses these two issues: it suggests that there are other regulatory options to competition law that should be explored and that investments should be made in facilitating cooperation among regulators to optimize the regulation of attention intermediaries.

JEL Classification: JEL: K21, K23

Suggested Citation

Monti, Giorgio, Attention Intermediaries: Regulatory Options and their Institutional Implications (July 7, 2020). TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2020-018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3646264

Giorgio Monti (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/g-monti

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
221
Abstract Views
764
rank
169,658
PlumX Metrics