Rationalising Corporate Disregard

Legal Studies, Vol. 40, p. 187, 2020

U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-21

44 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2020 Last revised: 17 Jul 2020

See all articles by Alan J. Dignam

Alan J. Dignam

Queen Mary University of London - School of Law

Peter B. Oh

University of Pittsburgh - School of Law

Date Written: July 8, 2020

Abstract

The area of corporate disregard has a poor reputation for certainty of reasoning. To provide an alternative way of approaching the issue, we conducted an empirical study of the relationship between rationale and outcome within UK corporate disregard cases from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. We examine the evidence from three perspectives. First, we examine the broad range of instrumental rationales found in the case law by disregard rates in order to identify where issues might be arising with individual rationales. Secondly, as suggested in the wider empirical literature, we examine the rationale rates by jurisdiction in order to see whether there were problematic interpretation issues concentrated in particular parts of the court levels. Thirdly, we examine the rationale rates by substantive claim to see whether contextual aspects of the doctrine were influencing outcomes. By providing an empirical study on the rationales instrumental to corporate disregard outcomes we aim to introduce a broader evidential view of where concerns may lie, which can both aid critique of key judicial historical developments such as Adams v. Cape Industries (1990) and Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) and provide a broader evidence base that might aid future judicial reform of the area..

Keywords: company law, corporate disregard, veil piercing, veil lifting, empirical study

JEL Classification: K10, K12, K13, K22, K41, K42, O52

Suggested Citation

Dignam, Alan J. and Oh, Peter B., Rationalising Corporate Disregard (July 8, 2020). Legal Studies, Vol. 40, p. 187, 2020, U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646445

Alan J. Dignam

Queen Mary University of London - School of Law ( email )

67-69 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London, WC2A 3JB
United Kingdom
0207 8828123 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/staff/dignam.html

Peter B. Oh (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - School of Law ( email )

3900 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15260-6900
United States
412.648.1101 (Phone)
412.648.2648 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.pitt.edu/people/peter-b-oh

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
79
Abstract Views
243
rank
361,470
PlumX Metrics