Common Analyst Networks and Corporate Disclosure Policy Choices

64 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2020 Last revised: 17 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jian Huang

Jian Huang

Towson University - College of Business and Economics

Bharat A. Jain

Towson University

Omesh Kini

Georgia State University

Yaoyi Xi

San Diego State University

Date Written: November 9, 2020

Abstract

We study the propagation of corporate disclosure policy choices across firms connected by common analysts. We find strong similarities in disclosure policies among firms that share common analysts. We show that these similarities are attributable to both analyst coverage initiation decisions and managerial adaptive learning/analyst influence effects. Further, we find that firms are more likely to be influenced by the disclosure policies of their common analysts’ network firms when they are covered by more influential analysts; and less likely when the firm is a more important player in its industry and the firms’ disclosure policies are generally considered to be relatively better than their network firms. Overall, our results suggest that common analyst networks facilitate the propagation of corporate disclosure policies.

Keywords: Common analysts, disclosure policy choices, analyst networks, managerial adaptive learning, analyst influence effects

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, K22, L22, L25

Suggested Citation

Huang, Jian and Jain, Bharat A. and Kini, Omesh and Xi, Yaoyi, Common Analyst Networks and Corporate Disclosure Policy Choices (November 9, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3646602

Jian Huang

Towson University - College of Business and Economics ( email )

8000 York Road
Towson, MD 21252
United States
410-704-3547 (Phone)
410-704-3454 (Fax)

Bharat A. Jain

Towson University ( email )

8000 York Road
Towson, MD 21252
United States
410-704-3542 (Phone)

Omesh Kini (Contact Author)

Georgia State University ( email )

University Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
404-651-2656 (Phone)

Yaoyi Xi

San Diego State University ( email )

San Diego, CA 92182-0763
United States

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