Subsidized R&D Collaboration: The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Performance

53 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2020

See all articles by Marco Kleine

Marco Kleine

University of Groningen

Jonas Heite

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Laura Rosendahl Huber

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

Date Written: July 9, 2020

Abstract

We study the causal effect of subsidized R&D collaboration on innovation performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In particular, we make use of a randomized controlled trial to analyze the effect of a nationwide innovation voucher scheme in the United Kingdom that grants SMEs across all industries financial support of up to 5,000 GBP for engaging the services of experts, e.g., from universities, research institutes or IP advisors, when pursuing an innovation-related project. Our results show that the innovation voucher program successfully promotes the execution of these innovation projects with positive short- and medium-term effects on product and service development, internal processes and intellectual property protection. Based on our results, we also provide some practical guidance to further improve the effectiveness of voucher programs.

Keywords: Randomized controlled trial; Industrial policy; SMEs; Open innovation; Collaboration; Subsidy; Innovation performance

JEL Classification: O31, O36, O38

Suggested Citation

Kleine, Marco and Heite, Jonas and Rosendahl Huber, Laura, Subsidized R&D Collaboration: The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Performance (July 9, 2020). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3648126

Marco Kleine (Contact Author)

University of Groningen ( email )

Groningen
Netherlands

Jonas Heite

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Laura Rosendahl Huber

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

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