Sex Offenders: Technological Monitoring and the Fourth Amendment

46 Search & Seizure L. Rep. 75 (2019)

16 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2021 Last revised: 25 May 2021

See all articles by Ben A. McJunkin

Ben A. McJunkin

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law

J.J. Prescott

University of Michigan Law School

Date Written: July 1, 2019

Abstract

In 2015, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance. Grady left open the question whether the search — and the state’s technological monitoring program more generally — was constitutionally reasonable. This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.

This Essay is adapted, with permission, from our article Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders, 21 New Crim. L. Rev. 379 (2018).

Keywords: Fourth Amendment, sex offenders, monitoring, GPS technology, search, privacy, post-release regulations

Suggested Citation

McJunkin, Ben A. and Prescott, J.J., Sex Offenders: Technological Monitoring and the Fourth Amendment (July 1, 2019). 46 Search & Seizure L. Rep. 75 (2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3651373

Ben A. McJunkin (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States

J.J. Prescott

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

3170 South Hall
701 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-763-2326 (Phone)

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