Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees

66 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2020

See all articles by Boris Ginzburg

Boris Ginzburg

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

José-Alberto Guerra

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Warn N. Lekfuangfu

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; CEP, London School of Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 14, 2020

Abstract

A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have different depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that reduce the probability of being pivotal - namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule - raise the share of votes for the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing supports these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, and of depth of reasoning, across individuals.

Keywords: expressive voting, committees, pivotality, laboratory experiment, level-k, structural estimation

JEL Classification: C57, C72, C92, D71, D91

Suggested Citation

Ginzburg, Boris and Guerra, José Alberto and Lekfuangfu, Warn N., Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees (July 14, 2020). Documento CEDE No. 26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3651458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3651458

Boris Ginzburg

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

José Alberto Guerra (Contact Author)

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://jguerraforero.wixsite.com/joseaguerra

Warn N. Lekfuangfu

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CEP, London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/warnlekfuangfu/

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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