The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts

28 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2003

Date Written: July 7, 2003

Abstract

This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure.

Keywords: Regulation Fair Disclosure, Selective Disclosure, Forecast Accuracy, Forecast Consensus

JEL Classification: G10, G29, G38, M41, M45

Suggested Citation

Irani, Afshad Jeevan, The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts (July 7, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=365380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.365380

Afshad Jeevan Irani (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University ( email )

204 West Washington Street
Lexington, VA 24450
United States
5404588628 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
323
Abstract Views
1,886
rank
95,940
PlumX Metrics