Organized Information Transmission

58 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2020 Last revised: 31 Jan 2022

See all articles by Laurent Mathevet

Laurent Mathevet

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh

Date Written: July 20, 2020

Abstract

In practice, how information can be transmitted to its recipients is just as important as its content. We formalize the concepts of horizontal and vertical information transmission and introduce two families of information structures, namely single-meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that specialize along these dimensions. We characterize the strategic outcomes that they implement in general finite incomplete information games and illustrate the resulting linear programming approach in a linear network example. We build on the characterizations to show that these families are unconstrained-optimal in binary-action games with strategic complementarities. Finally, we generalize these families to multiple meetings and random hierarchies and characterize the corresponding strategic outcomes.

Keywords: Incomplete information, information hierarchy, delegated transmission, meeting scheme, Bayes correlated equilibrium, information design

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Mathevet, Laurent and Taneva, Ina, Organized Information Transmission (July 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656555

Laurent Mathevet (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

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