Organized Information Transmission

52 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2020 Last revised: 5 Mar 2021

See all articles by Laurent Mathevet

Laurent Mathevet

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh

Date Written: July 20, 2020

Abstract

In reality, the organizational structure of information — describing how information is transmitted to its recipients — is as important as its content. In this paper, we introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture the horizontal and vertical dimensions of real-world transmission. We characterize the outcomes that they implement in general (finite) games and show that they are optimal in binary-action environments with strategic complementarities. Our application to classical regime-change games illustrates the variety of optimal meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies as a function of the objective.

Keywords: Incomplete information, information hierarchy, delegated transmission, meeting scheme, Bayes correlated equilibrium, information design

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Mathevet, Laurent and Taneva, Ina, Organized Information Transmission (July 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656555

Laurent Mathevet (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

Ina Taneva

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

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