A Political-Economy Analysis of the Provision of Urban Anti-Crime Technologies in a Model With Three Cities

RIT Economics Department Working Paper No 20-7

31 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2020

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology

Karima Kourtit

VU University Amsterdam

Peter Nijkamp

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 20, 2020

Abstract

We use a theoretical political-economy model with three cities and analyze three questions. First, should police in these cities have access to contentious crime fighting technologies such as facial recognition software? We describe a condition involving benefit, cost, and spatial spillover terms which tells us when the police ought to be provided with this technology. Second, if police are to be offered this technology then what are the properties of a policy regime that provides this technology in a decentralized way? We identify a condition that depends only on benefit and cost terms which tells us when this technology is to be made available in the cities in a decentralized way. Finally, what are the properties of a policy regime that provides the technology in a centralized way with equal cost sharing by the cities? We obtain two conditions involving benefit and spatial spillover terms that describe scenarios in which (i) the technology is provided with majority voting in a city even though it is inefficient to do so and (ii) it is efficient to provide the technology in a city but majority voting will lead to this technology not being provided.

Keywords: Centralization, Decentralization, Political-Economy, Technology, Urban Crime

JEL Classification: K42, R11, R50

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Kourtit, Karima and Nijkamp, Peter, A Political-Economy Analysis of the Provision of Urban Anti-Crime Technologies in a Model With Three Cities (July 20, 2020). RIT Economics Department Working Paper No 20-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656701

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology ( email )

Department of Economics, RIT
92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY NEW YORK 14623-5604
United States
5853134063 (Phone)
5854755777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Karima Kourtit

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, ND North Holland 1081 HV
Netherlands

Peter Nijkamp

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

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