What do the Data Reveal about (the Absence of Black) Financial Regulators?

24 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2020 Last revised: 15 Mar 2021

See all articles by Chris Brummer

Chris Brummer

Georgetown University Law Center; The Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL); Atlantic Council

Date Written: July 20, 2020

Abstract

This study published by the Brookings Institution provides empirical evidence on African Americans in positions of authority at financial regulatory agencies. It shows that African Americans have been largely excluded from senior leadership opportunities since the New Deal. It also shows that this absence is the product of a bipartisan failure to nominate African Americans to positions of authority, and provides evidence indicating that when African Americans accede to regulatory positions it is overwhelmingly the product of ‘sponsorship,’ or prompting, by the Executive branch, not the Senate. The paper also reveals a near total exclusion of African Americans from roles as senior policy staffers in current financial regulatory agencies, regardless of the political affiliation of the political appointees making hiring and staffing decisions.

Keywords: Diversity; Race; Financial Regulation; SEC; CFTC; FDIC; NCUA; Federal Reserve; OCC; FHFA

Suggested Citation

Brummer, Christopher J., What do the Data Reveal about (the Absence of Black) Financial Regulators? (July 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656772 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656772

Christopher J. Brummer (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/brummer-chris.cfm

The Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL) ( email )

Georgetown University Law Center
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