Whither Antitrust Regulation of Loyalty Rebates in China: The Tetra Pak Decision and Lessons from the EU

40(4) World Competition 613-636 (2017)

22 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2020

See all articles by Xingyu Yan

Xingyu Yan

Xiamen University - Law School; Zhejiang University - Guanghua Law School

Date Written: July 25, 2017

Abstract

On November 16, 2016, China issued the trailblazing Tetra Pak decision, which introduced the concept of loyalty rebates into the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law. This article is aimed at critically assessing the loyalty rebates analysis in this decision and discussing how the law could develop thereon. It argues that, while breaking the ground for an effects-based approach to loyalty rebates in China, this decision failed to establish a solid theory of harm. This destined that the decision-maker would not be able to engage in a contextualized effects-analysis it had envisaged. By comparing this problem to a similar one in EU competition law, this article suggests that the exclusive dealing analogy should be employed for loyalty rebates analysis.

Keywords: loyalty rebates, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, exclusive dealing

JEL Classification: K21, L11, L41

Suggested Citation

Yan, Xingyu, Whither Antitrust Regulation of Loyalty Rebates in China: The Tetra Pak Decision and Lessons from the EU (July 25, 2017). 40(4) World Competition 613-636 (2017), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3657981

Xingyu Yan (Contact Author)

Xiamen University - Law School ( email )

422 South Siming Road
Xiamen, Fujian 361005
China

Zhejiang University - Guanghua Law School ( email )

Zhejiang University Zhijiang Campus
51 Zhijiang Road
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310008
China

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