Dynamic Oligopoly and Price Stickiness

77 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2020

See all articles by Olivier Wang

Olivier Wang

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Iván Werning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 2020


How does market concentration affect the potency of monetary policy? The ubiquitous monopolistic-competition framework is silent on this issue. To tackle this question we build a model with heterogeneous oligopolistic sectors. In each sector, a finite number of firms play a Bertrand dynamic game with staggered price rigidity. Following an extensive Industrial Organization literature, we focus on Markov equilibria within each sector. Aggregating up, we study monetary shocks and provide a closed-form formula for the response of aggregate output, highlighting three measurable sufficient statistics: demand elasticities, market concentration, and markups. We calibrate our model to the empirical evidence on pass-through, and find that higher market concentration significantly amplifies the real effects of monetary policy. To separate the strategic effects of oligopoly from the effects this has on residual demand, we compare our model to one with monopolistic firms after modifying consumer preferences to ensure firms face comparable residual demands. Finally, the Phillips curve for our model displays inflation persistence and endogenous cost-push shocks.

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Suggested Citation

Wang, Olivier and Werning, Ivan, Dynamic Oligopoly and Price Stickiness (July 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27536, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3658830

Olivier Wang (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
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New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.olivierwang.com

Ivan Werning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Room E52-251
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-452-3662 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/iwerning

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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