What Shall We Do About Self-Preferencing?

Abstract

In recent times, self-preferencing by digital platforms has come to the fore. It is normal for companies to promote their own products over those of their competitors, and, in many cases, this can lead to efficiencies. However, a dominant company giving preferential treatment to its own products or services in downstream or related markets (self-preferencing) can also give rise to concerns.

Given its potential for pro-competitive effects, it remains challenging to identify the exact circumstances in which self-preferencing is anticompetitive. In addition, a number of the concerns raised by self-preferencing may not relate solely to their potential anticompetitive effects. This means that different tools – including, but going beyond competition law – may be used address problematic self-preferencing practices.

Keywords: Antitrust; Self-Preferencing; Regulation; Digital Platforms; Google; Theories of Harm; Regulatory Alternatives

JEL Classification: L43, L41, K21, K23, K2, L12, L13, L14, L50