What Shall We Do About Self-Preferencing?

Competition Policy International, June Chronicle 2020

12 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2020

See all articles by Pedro Caro de Sousa

Pedro Caro de Sousa

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Date Written: June 23, 2020

Abstract

In recent times, self-preferencing by digital platforms has come to the fore. It is normal for companies to promote their own products over those of their competitors, and, in many cases, this can lead to efficiencies. However, a dominant company giving preferential treatment to its own products or services in downstream or related markets (self-preferencing) can also give rise to concerns.

Given its potential for pro-competitive effects, it remains challenging to identify the exact circumstances in which self-preferencing is anticompetitive. In addition, a number of the concerns raised by self-preferencing may not relate solely to their potential anticompetitive effects. This means that different tools – including, but going beyond competition law – may be used address problematic self-preferencing practices.

Keywords: Antitrust; Self-Preferencing; Regulation; Digital Platforms; Google; Theories of Harm; Regulatory Alternatives

JEL Classification: L43, L41, K21, K23, K2, L12, L13, L14, L50

Suggested Citation

Caro de Sousa, Pedro, What Shall We Do About Self-Preferencing? (June 23, 2020). Competition Policy International, June Chronicle 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659065

Pedro Caro de Sousa (Contact Author)

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

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