Lockdown and Voting Behaviour: A Natural Experiment on Postponed Elections during the COVID-19 Pandemic

31 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2020

See all articles by Tommaso Giommoni

Tommaso Giommoni

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)

Gabriel Loumeau

ETH Zurich

Date Written: July 24, 2020

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to study the impact of the lockdown policy on voting behaviour, during the COVID-19 pandemic. We focus on France, where a differential lockdown was implemented across departments, based on the local diffusion of the disease. In particular, the country has been divided in two areas, red and green, subject to a “hard” and a “soft” lockdown, respectively. To measure voting behaviour, before and after the policy, we rely on 2020 French municipal elections: the first round took place before the introduction of the restrictions, while the second round was delayed after the end of the lockdown. We estimate a Spatial Regression-Discontinuity-Design model comparing the difference in outcomes between the two electoral rounds, at the border of red and green areas. The main results suggest that lockdown regulations significantly affected electoral outcomes. First, in localities under a harder lockdown, the incumbent’s vote share is higher as well as the consensus for Green parties. Second, voter turnout is larger where more stringent restrictions are adopted. These results suggest that lockdown measures strongly lead citizens to rally around the local incumbent politicians.

Keywords: COVID-19, lockdown, voting behaviour, French municipalities

JEL Classification: H12, I18, D72

Suggested Citation

Giommoni, Tommaso and Loumeau, Gabriel, Lockdown and Voting Behaviour: A Natural Experiment on Postponed Elections during the COVID-19 Pandemic (July 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659856 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659856

Tommaso Giommoni (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Gabriel Loumeau

ETH Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

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