Interest Rates, Market Power, and Financial Stability

48 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last revised: 16 Aug 2020

See all articles by David Martinez-Miera

David Martinez-Miera

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration; Center for Economic Policy Research

Rafael Repullo

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: July 2020

Abstract

This paper shows the relevance of market power to assess the effects of safe interest rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is costly and unobservable which creates a moral hazard problem with uninsured depositors. We show that lower safe rates lead to lower intermediation margins and higher risk-taking when intermediaries have low market power, but the result reverses for high market power. We examine the robustness of this result to introducing non-monitored market finance, heterogeneity in monitoring costs, and entry and exit of intermediaries. We also consider the effect of replacing uninsured by insured deposits, market power in raising deposits, and funding with both deposits and capital.

Keywords: Bank monitoring, bank risk-taking, Imperfect Competition, intermediation margins, monetary policy

JEL Classification: E52, G21, L13

Suggested Citation

Martinez-Miera, David and Repullo, Rafael, Interest Rates, Market Power, and Financial Stability (July 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15063, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3661406

David Martinez-Miera (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Center for Economic Policy Research ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Rafael Repullo

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
Spain
+34 91429 0551 (Phone)
+34 91429 1056 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cemfi.es/~repullo/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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