Information Chasing versus Adverse Selection in Over-the-Counter Markets

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See all articles by Chaojun Wang

Chaojun Wang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Junyuan Zou

INSEAD

Date Written: July 28, 2020

Abstract

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, informed speculators receive better pricing relative to uninformed liquidity traders in over-the-counter financial markets. Dealers compete for information by chasing informed orders so as to better position their future price quotes. On a multi-dealer platform, dealers' incentive of information chasing exactly offsets their fear of adverse selection. Through information chasing, dealers transform adverse selection by the informed into winner's curse when bidding for the uninformed. As a result, the adverse selection cost is entirely passed on to liquidity traders. Price dispersion and bid-ask spread endogenously arise from winner's curse. Both price dispersion and price efficiency increase with the mass of liquidity traders. As long as speculators have slightly correlated signals, they trade with the same dealer in equilibrium, giving rise to an information monopolist despite direct competition among the dealers. Post-trade transparency reduces information chasing incentive and thus price efficiency.

Keywords: Information chasing, adverse selection, over-the-counter, multi-dealer platform, winner's curse, pre-trade and post-trade transparency, price efficiency, price dispersion, information concentration

JEL Classification: G14, G18, D82

Suggested Citation

Wang, Chaojun and Zou, Junyuan, Information Chasing versus Adverse Selection in Over-the-Counter Markets (July 28, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Chaojun Wang (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Junyuan Zou

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

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