Jurisdictional Competition, Market Power, and the Compensation of Public Employees

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy

37 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2020 Last revised: 10 Mar 2021

See all articles by Vladimir Kogan

Vladimir Kogan

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 9, 2021

Abstract

Jurisdictional competition can encourage government efficiency but may also lead to collective action problems (e.g., bidding wars) that increase taxpayer costs. The net effect is particularly consequential for the cost of public employee compensation, which accounts for more than half of local government spending. Examining two decades of U.S. teacher salary data and changes in local teacher labor markets over time, I show that jurisdictional competition is associated with lower teacher salaries. One mechanism consistent with the evidence is that competitive markets help encourage lower spending through "yardstick competition.'' The findings may help explain why government consolidations designed to promote economies of scale and efforts to take advantage of coordinated buying power do not always produce the expected savings.

Keywords: urisdictional competition, Tiebout choice, government efficiency, monopsony, public employee compensation,K-12 education, public employment

JEL Classification: H4, H7, H75, I22, J3, J33, J38, J42

Suggested Citation

Kogan, Vladimir, Jurisdictional Competition, Market Power, and the Compensation of Public Employees (March 9, 2021). Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3663361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663361

Vladimir Kogan (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210
United States

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