Job Search, Job Posting and Unemployment Insurance During the COVID-19 Crisis

32 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2020 Last revised: 10 Aug 2020

See all articles by Ioana Elena Marinescu

Ioana Elena Marinescu

University of Pennsylvania - School of Social Policy & Practice; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daphné Skandalis

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Daniel Zhao

Glassdoor, Inc.

Date Written: July 30, 2020

Abstract

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many businesses had to close and unemployment skyrocketed. To help the unemployed, the CARES Act increased US unemployment benefits by $600 a week, which increased unemployment benefit replacement rates (benefit/wage) to unprecedentedly high levels, above 100% for many workers. We investigate the state of the labor market during the COVID-19 crisis, using job applications and vacancy listings by occupation, state and industry from the online platform Glassdoor. We document two new facts. First, applications-per-vacancy were higher during the COVID-19 crisis than before. This is because job vacancies decreased by 64% during the crisis, while job applications only decreased by 21%. Job applications decreased before the CARES Act, and remained relatively stable until June 2020. Second, applications and applications-per-vacancy were slightly lower in occupation-states with a larger increase in the replacement rate after the CARES Act, but these differences are not entirely explained by the CARES Act. Overall, our evidence suggests that employers did not experience greater difficulty finding applicants for their vacancies after the CARES Act, despite the large increase in unemployment benefits.

Keywords: unemployment insurance, job search, job vacancies

JEL Classification: J63, J64, J65

Suggested Citation

Marinescu, Ioana Elena and Skandalis, Daphné and Zhao, Daniel, Job Search, Job Posting and Unemployment Insurance During the COVID-19 Crisis (July 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664265 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664265

Ioana Elena Marinescu (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - School of Social Policy & Practice ( email )

3701 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6214
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daphné Skandalis

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Daniel Zhao

Glassdoor, Inc. ( email )

Mill Valley, CA 94941
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.glassdoor.com/research

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