ÉMERGENCE ET RÉGRESSION DE LA NOTION DE DÉMOCRATIE ENVIRONNEMENTALE AUX Etats-Unis (The Growth and Retreat of Environmental Democracy in the United States)

M.-A. Cohendet (ed.), Constitutional Environmental Law (Mare and Martin 2020)

12 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2020

See all articles by Erin Daly

Erin Daly

Widener University Delaware Law School

James R. May

Washburn University - Washburn University School of Law; Widener University Delaware Law School; Haub School of Law at Pace University

Date Written: January 1, 2020

Abstract

French Abstract: Il est presque impossible de décrire la relation entre l’environnementalisme et la démocratie en Amérique, non seulement à cause de l’espace restreint de cette contribution, mais aussi parce que chacun de ces concepts est complexe, vaste et multivalent, et que la relation entre les deux est indirecte et dégradée. Les incidents liés à l’activité environnementale sont rares, ils sont marqués autant par des actions que par des omissions, et il n’est donc pas évident de voir comment ils se situent en relation à des moments de praxis démocratique. En outre, chacun existe dans un réseau encore plus complexe et est impacté par des conditions et des événements sociaux, culturels, économiques et politiques. Il est donc impossible d'affirmer qu'aux États-Unis la longue avancée de l'environnementalisme a correspondu aux hauts et aux bas de l'activité démocratique.

Dans cette contribution, nous limiterons nos commentaires à l’expérience des États-Unis d’Amérique, non seulement en raison de l’influence considérable que cet État a eue et continue d’avoir à travers le monde, mais aussi parce que l’histoire américaine nous fournit l’illustration de beaucoup d’opportunités qui se sont présentées pour la protection de l’environnement et de beaucoup d’occasions manquées. Il s’agit de retracer brièvement une histoire remplie d'espoirs et de déceptions, de progrès et de reculs, d’émergence d’une idée de démocratie environnementale et de régression de cette idée.

Mais les États-Unis ne sont pas le seul pays à entretenir une relation entre environnementalisme et démocratie qui ne soit ni linéaire ni directe. Tout au long de l'histoire, et à travers le monde, certains progrès environnementaux ont été réalisés dans des lieux où la démocratie n'est pas profondément enracinée, mais il est également vrai que les pays dotés de démocraties profondément consolidées ne sont pas nécessairement les plus respectueux de l'environnement.

English Abstract: This chapter explains the lack of stronger environmental protection outcomes given the democracy-advancing attributes of U.S. law. The answer lies in understanding that the U.S. Supreme Court has construed the U.S. Constitution as embodying myriad anti-democratic limitations that thwart the effectiveness of democracy in environmental governance.

First, there are several doctrines that prevent plaintiffs from enforcing federal environmental laws. Relatedly, the Court has also been unwilling to afford more process in environmental matters than that which Congress specifically affords, for example, under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Second, structural imposts rooted in separation of powers can also prevent the enforcement of environmental laws, including the political question and abstention doctrines, forum non conveniens and the displacement doctrine. The federal government also possesses limited authority to protect the environment. The Court has also interpreted the Constitution as limiting federal and state authority to enact environmental laws in a variety of ways. Under the “Commerce Clause.”
Congress cannot require state governments or state officials to implement federal laws, including federal environmental programs. Moreover, Congress cannot threaten to withhold federal funding of such programs in ways that are ‘coercive’ to the states or subject states to private causes of action, including for violating federal environmental laws, unless the state consents to being sued.

Third, despite the constitutional charge to “take care that laws are faithfully executed,” the U.S. President has discretion to enforce federal environmental laws. The President also possesses unitary authority to establish foreign policy in environmental matters.

Fourth, while each state is a sovereign under a system known as “federalism,” the Court has concluded that the U.S. Constitution limits progressive environmental policies from the states in several ways. Moreover, the Court has construed Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment to prevent state and local government authorities from restricting the use of private property so as to protect the environment in ways that “go too far” and amount to ‘regulatory takings.’

Last, the Court has not construed the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution to advance environmental protection.

All of these facets affect environmental democracy in the United States.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Keywords: Environment, environmental democracy, supreme court, judicial authority, separation of powers, federalism, unitary executive, bill of rights, individual rights

Suggested Citation

Daly, Erin and May, James, ÉMERGENCE ET RÉGRESSION DE LA NOTION DE DÉMOCRATIE ENVIRONNEMENTALE AUX Etats-Unis (The Growth and Retreat of Environmental Democracy in the United States) (January 1, 2020). M.-A. Cohendet (ed.), Constitutional Environmental Law (Mare and Martin 2020), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664316

Erin Daly (Contact Author)

Widener University Delaware Law School ( email )

4601 Concord Pike
Wilmington, DE 19803-0406
United States
302-477-2143 (Phone)
304-477-2257 (Fax)

James May

Washburn University - Washburn University School of Law ( email )

1700 SW College Ave.
Topeka, KS 66621
United States

Widener University Delaware Law School ( email )

4601 Concord Pike
Wilmington, DE 19803-0406
United States

Haub School of Law at Pace University ( email )

78 N. Broadway
White Plains, NY 10603
United States

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