Partial Market Liberalization and the Efficiency of Policy Reform: The Case of the European Dairy Sector

Posted: 6 Jan 2003

See all articles by Z. Bouamra Mechemache

Z. Bouamra Mechemache

Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)

Jean-Paul Chavas

University of Wisconsin

Thomas L. Cox

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics

V. Requillart

Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)

Abstract

This article analyzes the efficiency of partial market liberalization and policy reform with an application to the European dairy sector. In a second best world, partial moves toward market liberalization are not always efficiency improving. We develop a general equilibrium model to investigate the efficiency implications of discrete changes in government policy. The analysis covers price and quantity instruments used in both domestic and trade policy. We derive simple conditions under which partial market liberalization is efficiency improving. We apply the approach to agricultural policy reform in the European dairy sector and identify market liberalization scenarios that are "not" efficiency improving.

Suggested Citation

Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra and Chavas, Jean-Paul and Cox, Thomas L. and Requillart, V., Partial Market Liberalization and the Efficiency of Policy Reform: The Case of the European Dairy Sector. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=366503

Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache

Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) ( email )

147, rue de l'Universite
Paris Cedex 07, 78-Yvelines 75338
France

Jean-Paul Chavas (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin ( email )

Taylor Hall
Madison, WI 53706
United States
(608) 261-1944 (Phone)
(608) 262-4376 (Fax)

Thomas L. Cox

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics ( email )

427 Lorch St.
Madison, WI 53706-1503
United States
608-262-9493 (Phone)

V. Requillart

Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) ( email )

147, rue de l'Universite
Paris Cedex 07, 78-Yvelines 75338
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
668
PlumX Metrics