Bank Regulation and Stock Market Stability across Countries

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 402-419. (2016)

Posted: 14 Sep 2020

See all articles by Walaa Elkelish

Walaa Elkelish

University of Sharjah

Jon Tucker

Coventry University; UWE Bristol

Date Written: November 14, 2016

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether bank capital strength and external auditing requirements influenced international stock market stability during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Bank mandatory regulation data are obtained from the World Bank database, while stock market stability is gauged for 385 listed banks across 43 countries by means of generalised least squares regression models. The authors find that mandatory capital strength requirements and the existence of mandatory audit increase stock market stability across countries. Further, more profitable banks increase stock market stability. The results are robust to both country institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics. This paper provides evidence of the impact of bank regulations on stock market stability during the global financial crisis, thereby providing a useful insight for stakeholders to enhance financial regulation and policy.

Keywords: Bank regulation, Financial crisis, Market stability, Capital strength, Mandatory audit

JEL Classification: G21, G28, M48, O16

Suggested Citation

Elkelish, Walaa and Tucker, Jon and Tucker, Jon, Bank Regulation and Stock Market Stability across Countries (November 14, 2016). Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 402-419. (2016), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665410

Walaa Elkelish (Contact Author)

University of Sharjah ( email )

United Arab Emirates

Jon Tucker

Coventry University ( email )

Priory Street
Coventry, CV1 5FB
United Kingdom

UWE Bristol ( email )

Frenchay Campus
Coldharbour Lane
Bristol, Avon BS16 1QY
United Kingdom

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