Slums and Pandemics

65 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2020 Last revised: 19 Apr 2022

See all articles by Luiz Brotherhood

Luiz Brotherhood

University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT)

Tiago Cavalcanti

University of Cambridge; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics

Daniel Da Mata

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics

Cezar Santos

Bank of Portugal

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2, 2020

Abstract

How do slums shape the economic and health dynamics of pandemics? A difference-in-differences analysis using millions of mobile phones in Brazil shows that residents of overcrowded slums engaged in less social distancing after the outbreak of Covid-19. We develop and calibrate a choice-theoretic equilibrium model in which individuals are heterogeneous in income and some people live in high-density slums. Slum residents account for a disproportionately high number of infections and deaths and, without slums, deaths increase in non-slum neighborhoods. Policy analysis of reallocation of medical resources, lockdowns and cash transfers produce heterogeneous effects across groups. Policy simulations indicate that: reallocating medical resources cuts deaths and raises output and the welfare of both groups; mild lockdowns favor slum individuals by mitigating the demand for hospital beds, whereas strict confinements mostly delay the evolution of the pandemic; and cash transfers benefit slum residents to the detriment of others, highlighting important distributional effects.

Keywords: COVID-19, Slums, Health, Social Distancing, Public Policies

JEL Classification: E17, I10, I18, D62, O18, C63

Suggested Citation

Brotherhood, Luiz and Cavalcanti, Tiago and Da Mata, Daniel and Santos, Cezar, Slums and Pandemics (August 2, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665695 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3665695

Luiz Brotherhood

University of Barcelona

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT) ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

Tiago Cavalcanti

University of Cambridge ( email )

Trinity Ln
Cambridge, CB2 1TN
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics ( email )

Daniel Da Mata (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics ( email )

Rua Itapeva 474
São Paulo, São Paulo 01332-000
Brazil

Cezar Santos

Bank of Portugal ( email )

Rua Francisco Ribeiro, 2
Lisbon, 1150-165
Portugal

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