Persuasion on Networks

38 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2020

See all articles by Georgy Egorov

Georgy Egorov

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; NBER

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: July 2020

Abstract

We analyze persuasion in a model in which each receiver can buy a direct access to the sender's signal or rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher bias increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or one, but not in-between. The impact of network density depends on this probability as well.

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Suggested Citation

Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, Persuasion on Networks (July 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27631, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665902

Georgy Egorov (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

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Evanston, IL 60208
United States

NBER ( email )

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Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

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Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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