Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium

33 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2003

See all articles by Denis Gromb

Denis Gromb

HEC Paris

David S. Scharfstein

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002


This Paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established firms (intrapreneurship). Intrapreneurship allows established firms to use information on failed intrapreneurs to redeploy them into other jobs. Instead, failed entrepreneurs must seek other jobs in an imperfectly informed external labour market. While this is ex-post inefficient, it provides entrepreneurs with high-powered incentives ex ante. We show that two types of equilibria can arise (and sometimes coexist). In a low (high) entrepreneurship equilibrium, the market for failed entrepreneurs is thin (deep). Internal (external) labour markets are thus particularly valuable, which favours intrapreneurship (entrepreneurship). We also characterize conditions under which there can be too little or too much entrepreneurial activity in equilibrium.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, venture capital, incentives

JEL Classification: D23, G24, G32, G34, M13

Suggested Citation

Gromb, Denis and Scharfstein, David S., Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium (October 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=366680

Denis Gromb

HEC Paris

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351

David S. Scharfstein (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-496-5067 (Phone)
617-496-8443 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/dscharfstein/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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